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MR. GEORGE HUEY, CONSUL GENERAL CLASSIFIC 5-8-01 9/15/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER ECLASSIFICATION

ROBERTO ALFREDO BASSAGAISTEGUY ECHEVARRIA REQUEST FOR NIV CONSIDERATION

Attached are copies of two memoranda prepared by my office captioned "COLLECTION OF INFORMATION BY ERP REGARDING MILGROUP," dated 8/3/76 and 8/5/76, respectively.

Also attached is Argentine Passport #7.014.518 belonging to captioned individual and a completed application for an NIV, with two current photographs attached.

BASSAGAISTEGUY had been employed on a contract basis at the University of Puerto Rico (UPR), Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, from 1971 until 1975 and had been issued J-l visas. During his residence in Puerto Rico, BASSAGAISTEGUY purchased an apartment and an automobile which he has not yet sold, since he anticipated returning to Puerto Rico for another year. However, BASSAGAISTEGUY's contract was not renewed. BASSAGAISTEGUY therefore applied for an NIV to return briefly to Puerto Rico in order to liquidate his assets, but was denied the visa. BASSAGAISTEGUY freely admits that he enjoyed living in Puerto Rico and would like to again reside there; however, he realizes that this would not be possible with an NIV visa. BASSAGAISTEGUY emphasizes that he only desires to travel to Puerto Rico for a brief period to settle his affairs and assures he will return to Argentina.

BASSAGAISTEGUY and his family are lifetime personal friends of a ranking officer of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE), who is the source of intelligence in the attached memoranda of my office concerning ERP information collection against the MILGROUP and the targeting of a MILGROUP member for assassination. I have known this SIE officer for the past six years and he is a trusted friend and an invaluable reliable source. He requested any possible assistance on BASSAGAISTEGUY's behalf in allowing the latter to travel to Puerto Rico in order to settle his personal business. I explained to the SIE official that an NIV had been denied to BASSAGAISTEGUY, because it appeared possible

- Addressee (Encs. 3)

- Buenos Aires (1/- 163 × 109-103)

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ROBERTO ALFREDO BASSAGAISTEGUY ECHEVARRIA REQUEST FOR NIV CONSIDERATION



that BASSAGAISTEGUY might attempt to illegally remain in Puerto Rico and work. The SIE official offered his personal guarantee that BASSAGAISTEGUY would return to Argentina after a brief reasonable period to handle his personal business in the United States. The SIE official noted that he understood the concern of the U. S. Government with the numerous aliens in the United States, working illegally, but stated that BASSAGAISTEGUY would not violate the U. S. Government's trust, should he be allowed to visit the United States to put his personal affairs in order. The SIE official requested that the Embassy reconsider the denial of an NIV to BASSAGAISTEGUY.

After speaking at length with BASSAGAISTEGUY and the SIE official, I am personally convinced that BASSAGAISTEGUY's motive for desiring to visit Puerto Rico is as stated - to liquidate his remaining assets there - and that he would not violate the terms of an NIV. Any reconsideration in granting BASSAGAISTEGUY an NIV would be appreciated by my office.

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE ACTING DCM

9/17/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

ERP

On 9/16/76, a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past reported the following information with regard to data appearing in the Buenos Aires news media with regard to a raid conducted by security forces at an apartment located in the 400 block of Avenida Forest in Chaparita, Federal Capital:

Officers of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA), Department of Federal Security, working with elements of SIDE acting on information obtained from ERP documents, raided an ERP safehouse on 9/14/76 at the above-described location. As a result of the raid, two ERP members were killed and three prisoners taken, one a female in her last month of pregnancy. The successor to slain ERP leader MARIO ROBERTO SANTUCHO, who was identified only by his ERP code name, "PANCHO", managed to escape by climbing down from the sixth floor where the ERP safehouse was located to the street by utilizing the exterior balconies of the building. The pregnant Temale ERP member also was utilizing this escape route when she was detected; however, she was apprehended in the street.

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government.

cc: l - POL-R ll--gAddressee

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THE ANDASSADOR BUENOS AIRES 9/20/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNDOCUMENTED THREAT AGAINST UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN ANGENTINA, CHILZ and UNUGUAY

On 9/17/76 and 9/20/76, a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past, provided the following:

Information was received on 9/14/76 by one of the Argentine Armed Forces Intelligence Services indicating that an individual under detention in Bolivia had disclosed the possibility of syncronized hostle terrorist action being taken against the U. S. Embassies in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Montevideo, Uruguay and Santiago, Chile. The information provided by the individual under detention in Bolivia did not specify the identity of the terrorist group or groups that planned to take this action. The information was passed to the Argentine Military Intelligence Service in question by the Bolivians withthe request that any information available be provided to the Bolivians to assist in their interrogation of the individual mader detention.

The receiving Argentine Military Intelligence Service, after canvassing the other Argentine Military Intelligence Services, as well as appropriate Federal and Provincial Police Intelligence Services, were unable to develop any information indicating that imminent syncronized hostile terrorist action against the U. S. Embassies in Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Santiago was carrently being planned by Argentine terrorists.

1 - Addressee 1 - The Ambassador, La Paz, Bolivia 1 - The Ambassador, Montevideo, Urugusy Copies: 1 - The Ambassador, Santiago, Chile 1 - POL-R CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELL 1 - SY REASON: 1 - DAO 3 - Bue (169-103 SECA SYT DECLASSIFY ON: X LL tlassified by 5931 AegentiNA Project (1 - 109-2)(1 - 80-173 Exempt from General Declassification /Lucero)/x Schedule of Tracutive Order 11632 Lucero (S) Schedule of Category 59 (2) RWS:gjk Automatically declassified on Indefinite. (10)

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The receiving Argentine Filitary Intelligence Service rated the above information as originating from a source whose reliability had not been established and Who obviously was being pressured under severe interrogation by the Solivians. The receiving Argentine Wilitary Intelligence Service, in evaluating the information, rated it as highly improbable, specifically with regard to syncronized terrorist attacks against U. S. diplomatic establishments in Gruguay, Argentina and Chile.

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including these of the Argentine. Solivian, Chilean or Drugsayan Covernments.

THE AMBASSADOR, BUENOS AIRES

9/21/76

LEGAL A TACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER, BUENOS AIRES

UNDOCUMENTED THREAT AGAINST UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND URUGUAY

100000 B Reference my memo 9/20/76.

On 9/21/76, a confidential source, who has provided reliable information in the past, provided the following information:

Supplemental information received from Bolivia by one of the Argentine armed forces intelligence services indicates that the plan to carry out synchronized hostile terrorist acts against U. S. diplomatic establishments in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Montevideo, Uruguay, and Santiago, Chile, is to be implemented by the pertinent groups in these countries belonging to the Junta Coprdinadora Revolucionaria (JCR). The JCR has assigned the code word "Operation Jasmin" to this project and from all available information provided to the Argentine armed forces intelligence service, the plan to carry out "Operation Jasmin" is definitely going forward and the source of the information under detention in Bolivia has provided accurate information concerning other activities of the JCR. Apparently information provided to one of the Argentine armed forces intelligence services from Bolivia indicates that the original source's information has been corroborated by two other individuals in a conversation which apparently was subject to electronics surveillance. The information contains no specifics but only indicates that "Operation Jasmin" will be implemented.

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials including those of the Argentine, Bolivian, Chilean or Uruguayan Governments.

- Addressee

- Ambassador, La Paz

1 - Ambassador, Montevideo 1 - Ambassador, Santiago

1 - POL/R, Buenos Aires

1 - SY, Buenos Aires

1 - DAO, Buenos Aires

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Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652

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109-103-4



Ford Motor Argentina S. A.

Guarlia de Correo 896 Correo Central Bucnos Afres

September 20, 1976

Mr. George Stanley Teckett U.S. Embassy Sarmiepto 551 Buenos Afres

Dear Mp. | Neckett:

This will refer to our conversation regarding the aftempt at the home of ing. Jorga N. Paquet, Manufacturing and Flant Engineering tunff languages, located at Jorga Newlers 1321, Hurlingham.

tre to the and about 100 shots were fired with a FAL machine gun.

A stake hom was also thrown and it went in through the kitchen window. The pick-up stopped before the house garage which allowed the guards to fire back from the back of the house with an ITACA machine gun. Then the guards repealed the attack the pick-up drove away and threw pamphlets, one of which is enclosed.

The front of the house suffered important damages but there were no casualties. The kitchen faces the street and it has a big window. The majority of the shots were fired there and if anyone had been inside he would have been killed.

inside he would have been killed.

On March 26, 1976 a similar attack took place at which the guards in charge of the custody of the house, were killed.

Sincerely, yours

M.F. Sibilda, Supervisor Plant Projection Section

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
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LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENES AIRES

Ru/

DEL EJERCITO ACADETORIZADO DE Oficial 1º Carlos Caride Por la dignidad del PUEBLO y la grandeza de la PATRIA



SIN JUSTICIA SOCIAL NO HABRA PAZ PARA NADIE

EJERCITO MONTONERO

Sección Pacho Sanandrea-Alejandro Veiga

SECRET

THE AMBASSADOR, BUENOS AIRES

9/22/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER, BUENOS AIRES

UNDOCUMENTED THREAT AGAINST UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY

Reference my memoranda 9/20 and 9/21/76.

During the evening of 9/21/76, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

It is noted that the source is a senior ranking officer of one of the Argentine military intelligence services

There has been considerable confusion in Argentine military intelligence circles with regard to information received from Bolivia related to "Operation Jasmin." Source in Bolivia originally provided information, which indicated that "Operation Jasmin" involved coordinated simultaneous attacks by the various components of the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (JCR) and the The information provided by the source Montoneros in Argentina. in Bolivia, who had in the past furnished reliable information that had been corroborated through other sources; indicated that the purpose of "Operation Jasmin" was to create havoc in Argentina in order to disrupt and discredit the Argentine Government internationally with specific emphasis on neighboring Uruguay and Chile. The source advised that to his knowledge components of the JCR and Montoneros would utilize stolen Argentine, Chilean and Uruguayan military uniforms to create incidents at the respective borders of these countries and possibly at the Paraguayan-Argentine border. Also the source advised that "other actions" would be carried out by the JCR and Montoneros in Argentina to further the objectives of "Operation Jasmin." The foregoing is the hard information provided by the source in Bolivia.

When asked to elaborate on "other actions" to be carried out in Argentina by the JCR and the Montoneros, the source in Bolivia indicated he believed that logical targets in Argentina would be foreign business interests and embassies, specifically those pertaining to the United States. The source also added that similar attacks against foreign interests might be carried out in Uruguay and Chile It is emphasized that the source at no time (1 - Ambassador, Montevill - Addressee

1 - Ambassador, Asuncion

1 - Ambassador, La Paz

1 - Ambassador, Santiago 1 - POL/R, Buenos Aires


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1 - SY, Buenos Aires
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2 - Buenos Aires (1-109-103) (1-JCR)

Exemption Category 35(2)

Automatically declassified on Indefinite RWS: jn (11) Source is Brigadier Carlos Otto Paladino, Chief, SID



furnished any information from his personal knowledge of "Operation Jasmin" indicating that the United States business and diplomatic establishments in Argentina, Chile or Uruguay had been specifically targeted in connection with "Operation Jasmin."

Because the source of this information is not directly available to Argentine military intelligence services, he obviously cannot be properly debriefed according to Argentine military intelligence standards. There is a great distinction between the hard information provided by the source in Bolivia and information provided by him, which basically is nothing more than his personal evaluation of events concerning "Operation Jasmin."

The information provided by the source in Bolivia concerning "Operation Jasmin" has been passed to all components of the Argentine military intelligence services, as well as the Federal Police of Argentina and Provincial Police Departments. These services in turn have provided their own evaluation of the data related to "Operation Jasmin," which may further create confusion with regard to the actual information provided by the source in Bolivia.

The source in Bolivia has previously furnished information which has been received by several of the Argentine military intelligence services, which as noted previously has been found to be generally accurate and has been corroborated. This particular source has been assigned a rating of "B" by the intelligence service to which the source belongs. The rating of a source as "B" indicates that he is generally reliable and has previously furnished reliable information. The information concerning "Operation Jasmin" as provided by the source in Bolivia has not been assigned a numerical evaluation by the intelligence service of the reporting source, since it is too nebulous and has not been corroborated through any other available sources in Argentina to date.

